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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-POWER OF CONGRESS TO
REGULATE PRIMARY ELECTIONS-Defendants were accused of alter-
ing ballots and falsely certifying the number of votes cast for the
various candidates in a primary election for a congressional rep-
resentative from the state of Louisiana. They were indicted under
federal statutes declaring it criminal to wilfully deprive any state
inhabitant, under color of state law, of rights or privileges se-
cured by the Constitution or to conspire to injure any citizen in
the exercise of the same.' Defendants demurred on the grounds
that the sections of the Criminal Code under which the indict-
ments were drawn did not apply to the state of facts disclosed
by the indictment and that, if applied to those facts, the sections
were unconstitutional. Held, when, as in this case, the state law
has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice
of federal officers, or where in fact the primary effectively con-
trols the choice, the right of the elector to have his ballot counted
in the primary is included in the right of the elector to select his
representatives protected by Article I, Section 2. The authority
of Congress to regulate the manner of elections includes the
power to regulate primary elections when, as in this case, they
are a step in the exercise by the people of their choice of repre-
sentatives in Congress. The acts charged constitute a violation
of the sections of the Criminal Code under which the indictment
is drawn. United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 867
(1941).
The Supreme Court with this opinion ripped another page
from the book of precedent. Although three justices dissented
1. "If two or more persons conspire to, injure, oppress, threaten, or in-
timidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi-
lege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
because of his having so exercised the same ... they shall be fined not more
than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be
thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created
by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 35 Stat. 1092 (1909), 18
U.S.C.A. § 51 (1927).
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any
State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both." 35 Stat. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927).
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from the conclusion reached,2 all agreed that it is within the
power of Congress to regulate primary elections. Newberry v.
United States," widely criticized 4 for holding that the regulation
of primary elections was not within the scope of Congress' au-
thority, was unanimously overruled.5 This conclusion seems en-
tirely sound. Congressional authority to regulate the manner of
holding elections is entirely ineffective in a large number of
states if it does not extend to the primary election. In the Demo-
cratic "solid south" the general election is a mere formality; in
other states the election laws may so restrict candidacy in the
general election, that, if corrupt elements are given free rein in
the primary election, the voter will be left with the meaningless
choice of the lesser of several evils.
The practical conclusion that Congress should have the power
to control primary elections, if for no other reason than to make
its control over general elections effective, may be strengthened
by respectable legal considerations. Many state courts have
reached the conclusion that the word "election" includes primary
elections.6 Regulation of primaries should be considered a "neces-
2. The dissenting justices agreed that Congress has the power to regulate
primary elections but thought that the right to vote at a primary was not
"a right or privilege secured by the Constitution" within the meaning of the
statutes under which the indictment was drawn. See United States v. Classic,
61 S.Ct. 1031, 1044, 85 L.Ed. 867, 881 (1941).
3. 256 U.S. 232, 41 S.Ct. 469, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921). The court had previously
refused to state an answer to the problem in United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919).
4. See Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1920-21 (1922) 16 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
22, 25; Harris, Primary Elections and the Constitution (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev.
451, 464; Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of
Justice (1941) 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 606, 608; Comment (1921) 31 Yale L. J.
90, 91; Notes (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 860, 863; (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 54, 56;
(1929) 378, 379; (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 527, 528; (1941) 1 Bill of Rights Rev.
316, 317.
5. It was stated in the opinion of the Classic case, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 85
L.Ed. 867, 874 (1941) that in the Newberry case, which involved a senatorial
election, a majority of the court did not actually hold opinions contrary to
the one voiced in the later case because, in a five-four decision, one of ma-
jority reserved opinion as to the effect of the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment (popular election of senators) on the problem. It is to be noted,
however, that, where, as here, election of representatives is involved the
reservation in the Newberry case indicates no doubt on the issue.
6. Analyses of the cases are to be found in Harris, supra note 4; Sar-
geant, The Law of Primary Elections (1918) 2 Minn. L. Rev. 97. A nose-count
finds a majority of the state courts holding primaries not to be "elections"
within the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions. See Harris,
supra, at 463; Sargeant, supra, at 102.
"One must not overlook the fact, however, that the state courts were
constrained to take this view in order to permit the legislature to regulate
primaries without being hampered by restraints which applied to their regu-
lation of elections. They did not distinguish elections and primaries in order
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sary and proper" step in effective control over the final choice of
federal officers.' Any other result may be considered contrary to
the idea of federal supremacy since it would subordinate the
federal government to state regulation of affairs of national con-
cern." It would, it has been said, violate the fundamental tenet
that every government should contain in itself the means of its
own preservation.9 A corrupt primary election is no more remote
an influence on the final choice of representatives than are other
acts which have been held within the power of Congress to pro-
hibit.1" And it has been argued that if Congress has no power to
to make the latter impossible, but in order to make them more flexible.
When a grant of power over elections is concerned, as it is in the case of
Article I, section 4 of the Constitution, and not a limitation on governmental
powers to interfere with suffrage rights, a different view is not only advis-
able, but is perfectly consistent with reasonable principles of constitutional
interpretation .... There would seem to be no necessary inconsistency in
construing 'elections' in the suffrage provisions of state constitutions so as
not to include primaries and in construing 'manner of elections' in Article I,
section 4 of the federal Constitution so as to include manner of holding pri-
maries." Harris, supra note 4, at 476-477.
7. See Classic v. United States, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 85 LEd. 867, 876 (1941);
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258, 41 S.Ct. 469, 475, 65 L.Ed. 913,
922 (1921) (dissent). See Harris, supra note 4, at 470; Notes (1921) 19 Mich.
L. Rev. 860; (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 54.
8. See dissent in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 281, 41 S.Ct. 469,
482, 65 L.Ed. 913, 930 (1921). Harris, supra note 4, at 465.
9. See dissent in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 283, 41 S.Ct.
469, 483, 65 L.Ed. 913, 932 (1921) citing Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 59. Note
(1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 54. See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599, 15 S.Ct. 900,
912, 39 L.Ed. 1092, 1108 (1895).
10. The basic" premise has been that the right to vote for representatives
is one secured by the Constitution. Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct.
152, 28 L.Ed. 274 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904, 59
L.Ed. 1355 (1915); Felix v. United States, 186 Fed. 685 (C.C.A. 5th, 1911). See
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62, 21 S.Ct. 17, 19, 45 L.Ed. 84, 88 (1899); Swaf-
ford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 492, 22 S.Ct. 783, 785, 56 L.Ed. 1005, 1007 (1902).
A statute including within its purview provisions to insure the honesty of the
registration of voters was held constitutional in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
37, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879). Violation of state laws by failing to properly convey
the poll books to the proper state official can be punished by the federal
government. Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 25 L.Ed. 715 (1879); In re Coy, 127
U.S. 731, 751, 8 S.Ct. 1263, 1268, 32 L.Ed. 274, 278 (1888); Intimidation of voters
is a violation of the constitutional right. Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651,
4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274 (1884); Aczel v. United States, 232 Fed. 652 (C.C.A.
7th, 1916). The right to have one's vote counted is included in the constitu-
tional right, and therefore the making of false returns is a violation of the
right. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355 (1915);
United States v. Pleva, 66 F. (2d) 529 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933); Luteran v. United
States 93 F. (2d) 395 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937). But bribery of voters is not a viola-
tion. United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 38 S.Ct. 269, 62 L.Ed. 676 (1917).
Nor is the inclusion of the votes of disqualified voters. United States v. K~an-
tor, 78 F. (2d) 710 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935). Nor is an agreement to change the votes
cast in recounting them a conspiracy to deprive voters of the right, since it
occurs only after the right has been freely exercised. Steedle v. United
States, 85 F. (2d) 867 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1936). But a conspiracy to deprive illiterate
negroes of their right to vote by preparing ballots in such a manner as to
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regulate congressional elections neither have the states.11
However, the majority opinion sets up what is apt to be-
come a troublesome criterion for determining when the right to
vote at a primary is one secured by the Constitution. 12 How much
state legislation with regard to primaries is necessary to make
the primary an "integral part" of the election procedure? How
nearly invariable must be the victory of a particular party at the
general election before it can be said that the primary "effec-
tively controls the choice" of representatives? Since the power of
Congress to regulate the manner of holding such primary elec-
tions is, apparently, plenary, and not governed by these limita-
tions, one escape from the difficulty would lie in the substitution
of clear congressional legislation for the general terms of the
sections of the Criminal Code under which the indictment was
drawn in the present case.
The decision in the Classic case will probably raise again the
question of the negro's right to vote in primary elections. In
Grovey v. Townsend13 it was held that the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments did not prevent a Texas political party, a
make it difficult for them to vote for the candidates for whom they wished
to vote violates the right. United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836 (D.C. Md.
1911). As does a-conspiracy to destroy and change ballots. United States v.
Clark, 19 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Mo. 1937). Accord, as to election of presidential
electors, Walker v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937). And a
conspiracy to prevent a public meeting for discussion of election issues and
support of certain candidates was held punishable by federal statute in
United States v. Goldman, 3 Woods 187, Fed. Cas. No. 15,225 (C.C. La. 1878).
11. It was argued that the power of the states to regulate congressional
elections stems from Article 1, Section 4. The word "election" in that article
could have no broader meaning as a grant of power to the states than it had
in connection with the congressional authority set forth. See dissent in
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 262, 41 S.Ct. 469, 476, 65 L.Ed. 913,
923 (1921). Harris, supra note 4, at 465; Note (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 54. Nor
could the states possess such a power among their reserved powers. Control
of the selection of federal officers could not have been reserved by implica-
tion to the states and withheld from the national government. See Harris,
supra note 4, at 465. The Tenth Amendment reserved only those powers
which the states had before the adoption of the Constitution, it was said.
They obviously did not have the power to regulate nominations for federal
office before the adoption of the Constitution, for there was no federal gov-
ernment. See Note (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 54, 56. The Tenth Amendment
today has, of course, little value as a basis for arguments concerning consti-
tutionality since the declaration in United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co.,
312 U.S. 100, 124, 61 S.Ct. 451, 462, 85 L.Ed. 395, 405 (1941) that it "states but
a truism," was merely "declaratory of the relationship between the national
and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution"; and
was adopted merely "to allay fears." The problem discussed above was recog-
nized in the opinion. See United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1042, 85 L.Ed.
867, 878 (1941).
12. See United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1042, 85 L.Ed. 867, 868 (1941).
13. 295 U.S. 45, 55 S.Ct. 622, 79 L.Ed. 1292 (1935).
NOTES
"voluntary association," from determining qualifications for its
members, and from thereby excluding unwanted persons on any
basis whatever where the primary election was conducted by the
party. In the Classic case, however, the right of all persons to
vote in primary elections was said to be protected by the Consti-
tution from abridgment by individual action where the primary
in practical operation governs the final selection of officers, even
though, apparently, it is not made by state law an "integral part"
of the state election machinery.14 It is certainly logical to con-
clude that a political party is no more free to deprive the negro
of this constitutional right than is the corrupt vote counter.
The decision in the Classic case should be welcomed as a step
forward toward insuring honest elections for congressional offices.
It will permit extension of such present election laws as the
Hatch Act,15 the failure of which to embrace primary elections
was due at least in part to fear that such a step would be held
unconstitutional.' 6 But it seems certain to provoke further litiga-
tion in the primary election field.
A.B.R.
IMPEACHMENT-JUDGES-MIsCONDUCT IN PERSONAL CAPACITY-
MISCONDUCT DURING PRIOR TERM-In a suit to determine whether
or not a district judge should be suspended from office pending
his impeachment proceedings for alleged malfeasance the defend-
ant excepts to evidence of misconduct in his personal capacity
and in a prior term. Held, a public official may be removed for
(1) misconduct in his personal as well as official capacity and (2)
misconduct in a prior term. Stanley v. Jones, 2 So. (2d) 45 (La.
1941).
Whether impeachment" proceedings are civil or criminal in
14. See 61 S.Ct. at 1039, 85 L.Ed. at 875.
15. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C.A. § 61 (Supp. 1940).
16. See United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1041, n. 5, 85 L.Ed. 867, 877,
n. 5 (1941).
1. The word "impeachment" in its original sense-derived from the Latin
impedicare (pedica, fetter, and pes, pedem, foot)-meant "to hinder" or "to
prevent" but in parliamentary usage its meaning of an accusation or charge
was acquired. Later, possibly in the sixteenth century, this word began to
assume its present meaning, a proceeding to remove a public official upon
an accusation of a crime or of some official misconduct or neglect. Yankwich,
Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution (1937) 26 Geo.
L. J. 849; Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1931) 610.
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